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ABSTRACT
Various fraud prediction tools have been developed to detect financial statement fraud triggered by earnings manipulation. 
Among them is the Beneish M-Score model as a financial forensic tool to gauge potential earnings manipulation in firms’ 
financial statements. The model was found to be effective in detecting 76% of earnings manipulating firms subjected 
to accounting enforcement actions by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (U.S. SEC). Furthermore, 
the earnings manipulation model was also successful in discovering 71% of the most prominent fraudulent financial 
reporting scandals in the United States prior to public announcement. The current study assesses the reliability of the 
Beneish M-Score model in detecting earnings manipulation and financial statement fraud committed by Malaysian public 
listed companies prior to public announcement. The research sample consists of 17 public listed companies of which 
their directors and top management have been charged and prosecuted by the Securities Commission Malaysia (SC) for 
committing fraudulent reporting and misstatement from 1996 until 2014. The results show that the Beneish M-score model 
is reliable in detecting earnings manipulation and financial statement fraud by 82% in 14 out of 17 listed companies 
charged for fraudulent financial reporting. The findings provide support for the application of the Beneish M-Score model 
by the management of the company to check for any irregularities in firms’ financial report so that adjustment can be 
made before submission to Bursa Malaysia to prevent from any potential backlash that could damage firm reputation. The 
model application is likewise beneficial to prospective and existing shareholders to assist their investment decision making 
in reducing risk of losses due to fraud. In addition, the findings suggest that the model can be applied by researchers, 
auditors, and enforcement agencies as an effective detection tool to signal potentially fraudulent reporting companies 
in Bursa Malaysia for further investigation and enforcement action.
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ABSTRAK
Di dalam mengesan penipuan penyata kewangan yang dicetuskan oleh manipulasi pendapatan, pelbagai model ramalan 
penipuan telah dibangunkan baru-baru ini. Antaranya ialah model Beneish M-Score yang telah digunakan sebagai alat 
forensik kewangan untuk mengesan potensi manipulasi pendapatan dalam penyata kewangan firma, yang dianggap 
sebagai menyalahi undang-undang dan peraturan perakaunan Amerika Syarikat. Model ini telah didapati berkesan 
dalam mengesan 76% daripada syarikat-syarikat yang telah memanipulasi pendapatan yang tertakluk kepada tindakan 
penguatkuasaan perakaunan oleh Suruhanjaya Sekuriti dan Bursa Amerika Syarikat (SEC). Tambahan pula, model 
pengesanan manipulasi pendapatan ini juga telah berjaya mengesan 71% daripada syarikat-syarikat yang terlibat di 
dalam skandal penipuan laporan kewangan yang paling menonjol di Amerika Syarikat sebelum pengumuman awam 
dilaksanakan. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk menilai keberkesanan model Beneish M-Score untuk mengesan manipulasi 
pendapatan dan penipuan penyata kewangan yang dilakukan oleh syarikat-syarikat tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia sebelum 
pengumuman awam dilakukan. Sampel kajian ini terdiri daripada 17 syarikat-syarikat tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia 
di mana pengarah dan pengurusan tertinggi berkaitan telah didakwa oleh Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia (SC) kerana 
melakukan penipuan laporan kewangan dan salah nyata dari tahun 1996 sehingga 2014. Keputusan kajian ini mendapati 
bahawa model Beneish M-score berkesan di dalam mengesan manipulasi pendapatan dan penipuan penyata kewangan 
pada kadar 82% bagi 14 daripada 17 syarikat-syarikat yang telah didakwa oleh Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia (SC) 
kerana melakukan penipuan laporan kewangan dan salah nyata. Penemuan kajian ini juga menyokong pengaplikasian 
model Beneish M-score oleh pihak pengurusan syarikat yang tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia untuk mengesan potensi 
penyelewengan di dalam laporan kewangan berkaitan supaya pelarasan boleh dilakukan sebelum dikemukakan kepada 
Bursa Malaysia, bagi mengelak daripada sebarang tindak balas yang berpotensi menggugat reputasi syarikat jika penipuan 
dikesan. Pengaplikasian model ini juga berfaedah dan boleh memberi manfaat kepada pemegang saham berpotensi dan 
sedia ada untuk membantu meraka bagi membuat keputusan pelaburan yang tepat bagi mengurangkan risiko kerugian 
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disebabkan oleh penipuan penyata kewangan. Di samping itu, model Beneish-Mscore ini boleh dimanfaatkan oleh 
penyelidik, juruaudit dan agensi-agensi penguatkuasaan sebagai alat pengesanan penipuan penyata kewangan yang 
berkesan bagi memberi isyarat kepada mereka untuk melakukan siasatan selanjutnya sebelum melaksanakan tindakan 
penguatkuasaan.
Kata kunci: Manipulasi pendapatan; model Beneish M-Score; penipuan penyata kewangan
Commission might be selective in pursuing only those 
fraud cases subjected to decline in share performance 
after revelation of manipulation due to larger losses 
inflicted to shareholders (Dechow, Ge, Larson & Sloan 
2011). Furthermore, without the assistance of internal 
whistle blowers in highlighting potential fraud scandal 
in a company, financial statement fraud detection by 
enforcement authorities will be challenging (US Securities 
and Exchange Commission 2014). However, the rate of 
whistleblowing by US workforce relating to accounting 
misstatements was only at the rate of 40% in 2013 (Ethics 
Resource Center 2013), which means that the majority of 
potential accounting fraud cases remain unreported. 
To resolve this issue, the application of earnings 
manipulation detection model issued by Beneish et al. 
(2013) and Beneish (1999) should be considered to ensure 
immediate detection of potential financial statement fraud 
being made before public announcement by enforcement 
authorities and to narrow the whistleblowing gap. This 
model has proved capable of accurately detecting 76% 
of the public listed corporations subjected to U.S. SEC’s 
accounting enforcement actions (Beneish 1999) and 
71% of the most prominent financial reporting scandals 
before public announcement was made by relying on only 
accounting data disclosed in the annual report (Beneish 
et al. 2013). Nevertheless, the reliability of the Beneish 
M-score in detecting financial statement fraud has only 
been proven in the United States and has yet to be extended 
to Malaysia. Accordingly, this paper tests the reliability 
of the Beneish M-score model in detecting financial 
statement fraud scandals by Malaysian public companies 
listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia indicted for 
fraudulent financial reporting by the Malaysian Securities 
Commission. 
The sample for this study consists of 17 public listed 
companies of which their directors and top management 
have been charged and prosecuted for financial statement 
fraud by the Malaysian Securities Commission from 1996 
until 2014. The test reveals that the Beneish M-score model 
has been successful in detecting 14 out of 17 companies 
prosecuted for fraudulent financial reporting by the 
Malaysian SC at 82% accuracy rate. This study is important 
as it provides strong support for the application of the 
Beneish M-score model in detecting potential financial 
statement fraud before public announcements. This will 
be beneficial for the management of a company as they 
can utilise the model to verify whether the company’s 
financial statements contain any irregularities before 
submission to Bursa Malaysia to avoid future potential 
penalty or backlash. It is also useful for stakeholders such 
as prospective and existing shareholders, auditors, forensic 
INTRODUCTION
Financial statement fraud is the costliest type of fraud, 
generating median losses valued at USD 1 million 
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 2014). 
It can negatively influence the capital markets as a 
consequence of losing the investors’ confidence, and can 
irrevocably damage the company’s reputation (Centre for 
Audit Quality 2010). Other major implications include 
significant losses of shareholders values due to abnormal 
stock price decline, delisting from stock exchange, and 
material assets sales upon fraud discovery (COSO 2010). 
Furthermore, based on the report issued by the Committee 
of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) in year 2010, there were 347 alleged cases of public 
companies committing fraudulent financial reporting from 
1998 to 2007, in comparison to 294 cases from 1987 to 
1997 in the United States. This statistic was contributed 
to, amongst others, by the high-profile frauds in Enron, 
WorldCom, and other firms bringing about the total 
cumulative misstatement or misappropriation of nearly 
USD120 billion across 300 fraud cases. Malaysia also has 
its share of high-profile corporate fraudulent reporting 
scandals, as evidenced in the enforcement action taken 
by the Malaysian Securities Commission and its public 
media releases. Among the recent high-profile Malaysian 
fraudulent financial reporting cases as reported on the 
Malaysian Securities Commission website were Megan 
Media Holdings Bhd., Mems Technology Berhad, 
Transmile Group Bhd., Axis Incorporation Berhad, and 
Silver Bird Berhad which resulted in total misstatement 
worth billions of ringgit. Furthermore, 18 additional 
public companies listed on the main board have been 
found to have misstated their financial statements in post 
years 2012 to 2015 as testified by Bursa Malaysia (2015), 
upon the introduction of Malaysian Codes of Corporate 
Governance 2012 (MCCG 2012), which was supposed to 
enhance the integrity of financial statements (Securities 
Commission Malaysia 2012). 
Despite successful attempts to nab fraudulent financial 
reporting companies, numerous corporations committing 
financial statement fraud remain well-camouflaged from 
detection by the enforcement authorities (Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners 2012; Chen, Firth, Gao & Rui 
2006). This is because according to Zhou and Kapoor 
(2011), the perpetrator has the necessary resources to 
fool the system and any detection mechanism resulting 
in discovery of fraud to be extremely difficult. Even 
upon the discovery of financial statement fraud, it will 
take a year and a half for it to be made public (Beneish, 
Lee & Nichols 2013). In addition, the Securities 
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investigators, and academic researchers in utilising the 
model to not only detect potential financial statement 
fraud, but to also predict potential companies subject to 
prosecution for violation of accounting rules. 
This study also contributes towards the knowledge 
on financial statement fraud investigation as it extends 
support by proving the reliability of the Beneish M-score 
model in detecting fraudulent financial reporting beyond 
the United States border by extending it to Malaysian 
public listed companies. Due to the model’s high reliability 
rate of financial statement fraud detection in Malaysia, it 
will be possible to use the M-score model for identifying 
potential proxies to represent actual financial statement 
fraud cases in a current research setting.
This paper proceeds as follows; the literature 
review related to earnings manipulation and fraudulent 
financial reporting as well as the Beneish M-Score 
Model is elaborated on in the next section followed by 
methodological issues pertinent to this study. The results 
are then presented and discussed, followed by conclusion 
and suggestion for future research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND FRAUDULENT 
FINANCIAL REPORTING
Earnings manipulation is defined as the violation of 
accounting rules by management to positively reflect 
the company’s financial performance through illegal 
earnings management schemes (Beneish 1999). Such 
schemes involve deliberate misstatements on financial 
statements which violate Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) or Accounting Standards (Magrath & 
Weld 2002), resulting in fraudulent financial reporting. On 
the other hand, fraudulent financial reporting is defined 
by International Standards on Auditing 240 (2009) as 
the deception of users of financial statements through 
intentional misstatements and omissions of amounts and 
disclosure in the financial statements. The link between 
earnings manipulation scheme which involve deliberate 
misstatements on financial statements and fraudulent 
financial reporting is supported by the following studies. 
The first study sponsored by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
in 2010 analysed US public companies identified for 
committing fraudulent financial reporting from 1998 
to 2007. The COSO 2010 sponsored study found 61% of 
the corporations’ fraudulent reporting scandals resulted 
from misstatement in revenue recognition. Another study 
conducted by the United States Government Accountability 
Office in 2013 analysed financial restatements data of both 
exempt and non-exempt companies required to make 
internal auditor attestation in the United States. The study 
found more than 50% of restatement cases in both exempt 
and non-exempt companies in the United States from 2005 
to 2011 were caused by misstatements in expenses and 
inaccurate revenue recognition. In addition, Abdullah, 
Mohamad Yusof and Mohamad Nor (2010) investigated 
the incidence of financial restatements among Malaysian 
public listed companies from 2002 to 2005 and found 
54% of restatement cases derived from misstatements in 
revenue and expenses. Thus, based on the above studies, it 
can be generalised that the majority of financial statement 
frauds were contributed to by earnings manipulation 
practices employed by corporations.
Two main studies examining the development of 
a model to detect earnings manipulation in financial 
statements were carried out by Beneish (1997) and 
Beneish (1999). Beneish (1997) developed a model 
and found that the model is capable to distinguish firms 
committing earnings manipulation in violation of US 
GAAP against firms practicing earnings management 
with high discretionary accruals. Furthermore, the model 
estimated that potential earnings manipulators are four 
to five times more likely to violate accounting rules as 
compared to firms engaging in earnings management 
with aggressive accruals (high discretionary accrual). 
Beneish (1999) later developed a model to distinguish 
manipulators from non-manipulators by utilising 
financial statements variables, as identified in Beneish 
(1997). He matched 74 companies that manipulated 
earnings with 2,332 COMPUSTAT non-manipulators based 
on two-digit SIC industry and year. He then calculated an 
index for eight financial statement ratios being analysed, 
with higher index values indicating potential earnings 
manipulation. The study also revealed that day’s sales 
in receivables index, gross margin index, asset quality 
index, sales growth index, and accruals are significant in 
explaining manipulation, which later led him to develop 
a probit model with probability cut offs that reduce the 
expected costs of misstatements. The model was found 
to accurately identify potential earnings manipulators in 
76% of the public listed corporations subjected to the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) accounting 
enforcement actions. In addition, Dechow, Ge, Larson 
and Sloan (2011) examined financial characteristics 
of misstating firms and developed a model to predict 
misstatements by compiling a database of firms subjected 
to enforcement actions by the U.S. SEC for allegedly 
misstating their financial statements. They found that at 
the time of misstatement, accrual quality is low and both 
financial and non-financial measures of performance 
declined. Furthermore, off-balance sheet financing is 
more likely to take place during misstatement periods 
and managers of misstating firms appear sensitive to 
their firm’s stock price. The researchers also developed 
a composite measure of the likelihood of manipulation 
(F-score) that can be used as a red flag or signal of the 
likelihood of earnings management or misstatement. The 
F-scores model was later used to predict misstatement 
in a holdout sample of firm-years from 1999 until 2002, 
which correctly identified misstating firms by 51.4%.
Further evidence to prove the connection between 
earnings manipulation and financial statement fraud is 
Bab 3.indd   25 9/20/2016   3:02:13 PM
26 Jurnal Pengurusan 46
provided by Beneish, Lee and Nichols (2013) who 
attempted to study whether the similar M-score model 
useful for detecting earnings manipulation can be 
used reliably to detect the most prominent fraudulent 
financial reporting scandals prior to public disclosure. 
The result proves the worthiness of the M-score model 
of detecting 71% of the most prominent financial 
reporting scandals in addition to earnings manipulation. 
This is confirmed in another study by Omar, Koya, 
Sanusi and Shafie (2014) who examined a case of 
financial statement fraud on a Malaysian listed company 
named Megan Media Holdings Berhad (MMHB). They 
utilised both the Beneish M-score model and ratio 
analysis to confirm whether these tools were effective 
in detecting fraudulent financial reporting in MMHB, 
which had been subjected to enforcement action by the 
Malaysian SC. The result revealed that Beneish M-score 
model is effective for detecting financial statement 
fraud in MMHB during the year of misstatement, which 
is in line with the findings by Beneish, Lee and Nichols 
(2013). Furthermore, according to Mantone (2013), 
the high accuracy rate of detecting potential earnings 
manipulation and financial statement fraud by the 
Beneish M-score model can assist forensics examiners 
to investigate fraud in the most effective and efficient 
manner. Rather than that, the M-score model has been 
extensively used to detect earnings manipulation and 
assess the quality of financial statements as evidenced 
in texts and articles issued to auditors, professional 
investors, and certified fraud examiners (Beneish, Lee 
& Nichols 2013; Golden, Skalak, Clayton & Pill 2006; 
Mantone 2013; Warshavsky 2012). The model has also 
been supportive towards certified fraud examiners 
(CFEs) in sensing fraudulent financial reporting signs 
in corporations (Harrington 2005).
Based on previous studies, Beneish (1999) and 
Beneish et al. (2013) have proven the capability of 
the M-score model in detecting potential financial 
statement fraud with high accuracy rate of 76% and 
71% respectively. Nevertheless, these results were only 
applicable to US samples. Furthermore, limited attempts 
were made to test the M-score model fraud detection 
capability as evidenced in the study conducted by 
Omar et al. (2014), which was limited to one sample of 
fraudulent financial reporting companies identified by 
the Malaysian SC. The study revealed successful fraud 
detection by M-score model but the results prohibit 
generalisation on the reliability of the M-score model for 
Malaysian public listed companies due to limited samples 
used. Thus, the current study attempts to fill this gap to 
gauge the reliability of the Beneish M-score model in 
detecting financial statement fraud by Malaysian public 
listed companies. Although there are many other fraud 
prediction model available for consideration, the Beneish 
M-Score model is selected due to its overwhelming 
reputation as argued by Beneish, Lee and Nichols (2013), 
Golden, Skalak, Clayton, and Pill (2006), Mantone 
(2013), and Warshavsky (2012). Furthermore, even 
though Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011) attempted 
to extend the study of the Beneish M-score model by 
formulating a new model known as F-score to predict 
financial misstatements, it was only capable of correctly 
identifying 51.4% of misstating firms in a holdout sample 
of firm-years from 1999 until 2002 which was lower than 
M-score’s performance.
Thus, in line with the above argument, the following 
hypothesis is developed:
H1 The Beneish M-score model is reliable in detecting the 
majority of companies committing financial statement 
fraud as disclosed by the Malaysian Securities 
Commission.
BENEISH M-SCORE MODEL
Beneish (1999) developed a model to distinguish earnings 
manipulators who violate accounting rules from non-
manipulators by utilising financial statement variables. 
Prior to its development, he created a profile of earnings 
manipulating firms as identified by the US SEC’s accounting 
enforcement actions. The model named Beneish M-score, 
consisted of 8 ratios to capture either financial statement 
distortions resulted from earnings manipulation or to 
identify inclination to engage in earnings manipulation 
as reflected below. 
M-Score = -4.84 + 0.92DSRI + 0.528GMI + 0.404AQI 
+ 0.892SGI + 0.115DEPI – 0.172SGAI + 
4.679TATA – 0.327LVGI
The details of the eight variables in the form of indices 
based on Beneish (1999) are as stated below:
Variable Details
DSRI Days’ Sales in Receivables Index. This measures the 
ratio of days’ sales in receivables versus prior year as 
an indicator of revenue inflation.
GMI Gross Margin Index. This is measured as the ratio of 
gross margin versus prior year. A firm with poorer 
prospects is more likely to manipulate earnings.
AQI Asset Quality Index. Asset quality is measured as the 
ratio of non-current assets other than plant, property 
and equipment to total assets, versus the prior year. It 
intends to measure the company’s risk propensity to 
capitalise cost.
SGI Sales Growth Index. This measures the ratio of sales 
versus prior year. While sales growth is not itself 
a measure of manipulation, the evidence suggests 
that growth companies are likely to find themselves 
under pressure to manipulate in order to keep up 
appearances.
DEPI Depreciation Index. This is measured as the ratio of 
the rate of depreciation versus prior year. A slower 
rate of depreciation may mean that the firm is revising 
useful asset life assumptions upwards, or adopting a 
new method that is income friendly.
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SGAI Sales, General and Administrative expenses Index. 
This measures the ratio of SGA expenses to the prior 
year. This is used on the assumption that analysts 
would interpret a disproportionate increase in sales 
as a negative signal about firms’ future prospects
LVGI Leverage Index. This measures the ratio of total debt to 
total assets versus prior year. It is intended to capture 
debt covenants incentives for earnings manipulation
TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets. This assesses the extent 
to which managers make discretionary accounting 
choices to alter earnings. Total accruals are calculated 
as the change in working capital accounts other than 
cash less depreciation. It measures a risk relating to 
accrual policies being used as financing mechanism 
for losses.
The formula used to calculate the Beneish M-score’s 
variables indices based on Beneish (1999) are as 
follows:
Beneish, Lee and Nichols (2013) made a minor 
change on the M-score model by replacing the Total 
Accruals Total Assets (TATA) variable with Accruals 
(Accruals) in order to make use of information available in 
cash flow statements rather than the statement of financial 
position. Furthermore, according to them, the change was 
made in order to be consistent with literature on accrual, 
and although calculation for the TATA variable is slightly 
different than the Accruals variable, they yielded similar 
results. The new variable replacing the TATA variable in 
the M-score model based on Beneish, Lee and Nichols 
(2013) is reflected below.
Accruals  This measures component of accounting profit not 
contributed by cash profit during the current year.
Accruals = Income before extraordinary item – Operating cash flow
   Total Assets
The M-score is used to describe the degree of possible 
manipulation on earnings and any other type of fraudulent 
activity (Mantone 2013). The model’s total score indicates 
the level of probability of earnings manipulation and 
financial statement fraud. Mantone (2013), Warshavsky 
(2012), Omar et al. (2014) and many other researchers 
proposed a total M-score greater than -2.22 as an indicator 
of potential earnings manipulation and financial statement 
fraud. Nevertheless, Beneish (1999) recommends either 
(1) a score greater than -1.89 with detection accuracy 
of 76% but potential misclassification of 24% of 
manipulators and 17.5% of non-manipulators; or (2) a 
score greater than -1.78 with detection accuracy of 74%, 
but potential misclassification of 26% of manipulators 
and 13.8% of non-manipulators. Nevertheless Beneish, 
Lee and Nichols (2013) have applied a score greater than 
-1.78 based on Beneish (1999) to test the ability of the 
M-score model to detect financial statement fraud among 
prominent fraudulent financial reporting scandals with 
71% accuracy rate. It has also assisted in identifying 
potential fraudulent companies prior to enforcement action 
taken by the authority in the United States such as in the 
case of Enron (Warshavsky 2012). 
On top of analysing the M-score model total 
score to distinguish earnings manipulator against non-
manipulators, each of the 8 individual variables that make 
up the model can also be scrutinised independently to 
assist in identifying which area in the financial statement 
is actually the cause for concern to trigger further 
investigation. To complement this, Beneish (1999) came 
up with a defined threshold for each of the 8 variables of 
the M-score model based on the mean score to assist in 
distinguishing between potential manipulators and non-
manipulators. 
The defined threshold for the 8 variables based on 
Beneish (1999) are as follows:
 Index Type Manipulators Non-
   Manipulators
Days Sales in Receivables 1.465 1.031  
 Index 
Gross Margin Index 1.193 1.014
Asset Quality Index 1.254 1.039
Sales Growth Index 1.607 1.134
Depreciation Index 1.077 1.001
Sales, General, Administrative 1.041 1.054 
 Expenses Index 
Leverage Index 1.111 1.037
Total Accruals to Total Assets 0.031 0.018
The Beneish M-score model’s variables of indexes 
are potentially powerful gauges that can assist in further 
examination of any unexpected results in the company’s 
financial statements (Golden et al. 2006). Nevertheless, 
according to Beneish (1999), the individual indexes are 
not faultless and can potentially produce inaccurate results. 
Thus, the underlying components of those indexes may 
need further evaluation if any of those indexes exceed 
DSRI = Receivablest / Salest
  Receivablest-1 / Salest-1
GMI = (Salest-1 - Cost of goods soldt-1) / Salest-1
  (Salest - Cost of goods soldt) / Salest
AQI = (1 - Current Assetst + PP&Et) / Total Assetst
  (1 - Current Assetst-1 + PP&Et-1) / Total Assetst-1
SGI = Salest
  Salest-1
DEPI = Depreciationt-1 / (Depreciationt-1 + PP&Et-1)
  Depreciationt  / (Depreciationt  + PP&Et)
SGAI = Sales, general and administrative expenset / Salest
  Sales, general and administrative expenset-1 / Salest-1
LVGI = (LTDt + Current liabilitiest) / Total Assetst
  (LTDt-1 + Current liabilitiest-1) / Total Assetst-1
TATA	 =	 ΔCurrent	Assetst -	ΔCasht)	-	ΔCurrent	liabilitiest -
  ΔCurrent	maturities	of	LTDt -	Δincome	tax	payablet 
  - Depreciation and amortizationt
  Total assets
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the defined threshold above, and the potential for fraud 
is higher when there is no plausible explanation for the 
difference (Golden et al. 2006).
Details extracted from two consecutive periods’ 
financial statements (fraud year and prior to fraud year) of 
fraudulent reporting companies are to be used to calculate 
the Beneish M-score model total score. Cut-off scores 
greater than -2.22, -1.89, and -1.78 are to be applied to 
gauge potential earnings manipulation practice and fraud 
in financial statements of the companies investigated. 
Furthermore, each of the 8 variables indexes of the 
Beneish M-Score is to be scrutinised against the defined 
manipulation threshold as provided by Beneish (1999).
FRAUD TRIANGLE THEORY AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
A study on detection of financial statement fraud can 
be explained by Fraud Triangle theory. Cressey (1953) 
established a fraud triangle theory which explained 
the violation of trust by trusted persons under specific 
circumstances. According to him, 
…trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of 
themselves as having financial problem which is non-sharable, 
are aware that this problem can be secretly resolved by violation 
of the position of financial trust, and are able to apply to their 
own conduct in that situation verbalisations which enable them 
to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with 
their conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds 
or property. (Cressey 1953: 30)
assets, involves incentive or pressure to commit fraud, a 
perceived opportunity to do so and some rationalisation 
of the act” (Ref: Para. 3). The standard also provided 
examples for the three fraud risk factors. For example, 
incentive or pressure to commit fraudulent financial 
reporting may exist when management is under pressure, 
from sources outside or inside the entity, to achieve an 
expected (and perhaps unrealistic) earnings target or 
financial outcome. A perceived opportunity to commit 
fraud may exist when the trust violator is in a position of 
trust or has knowledge of specific deficiencies in internal 
control. The standard also mentioned that individuals 
may be able to rationalise committing a fraudulent act. 
Furthermore, the Fraud Triangle provides an efficient 
conceptual model that has broadly served as an aid to the 
anti-fraud community in understanding the antecedents to 
fraud (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher & Riley 2012).
In this study, the Beneish M-score model as studied 
in Beneish et al. (2013) and Beneish (1999) is used as a 
framework for testing its reliability in detecting financial 
statement fraud cases disclosed by the Malaysian Securities 
Commission. The model comprises the following equation 
formula:
M-Score = -4.84 + 0.92DSRI + 0.528GMI + 0.404AQI 
+ 0.892SGI + 0.115DEPI – 0.172SGAI + 
4.679ACCRUALS – 0.327LVGI (1)
The composite M-score total will be analysed against 
pre-determined cut-off score of greater than -2.22, -1.89 
and -1.78, to detect financial statement fraud.
METHODOLOGY
All public companies listed on the Malaysian stock 
exchange (Bursa Malaysia) that have been identified and 
charged for committing fraudulent financial reporting by 
the Malaysian Securities Commission from year 1993 
to 2014 were selected as the research sample. The list 
of those companies was obtained from the Malaysian 
Securities Commission’s website which provides a 
comprehensive disclosure of the companies being charged 
for violations of various Securities Commission Act and 
Regulations. In order to ensure that the list of companies 
taken as samples is consistent with the fraudulent 
financial reporting offence, only those companies that 
have violated Section 122A, Section 122B, Section 
122C, Section 122D of the Securities Industry Act 1983 
and Regulation 4 of the Securities Industry (Compliance 
with Approved Accounting Standards) Regulation 1999 
related to fraudulent and misstated financial statements 
were considered. 
Details of the companies committing various violations 
of the Securities Commission Act and Regulations were 
obtained from various sources; (1) Enforcement actions 
list which is divided into criminal prosecution list, civil 
actions and regulatory settlements list, cases compounded 
In line with Cressey (1953), frauds comprise three 
common characteristics. Firstly, opportunity or incentive 
for the fraudster to commit fraud. Secondly, there is a 
pressure or perceived non-sharable financial need for 
the fraudster. Thirdly, the fraudster rationalised that their 
personal codes of ethics is coherent with their fraudulent 
act. Thus, the three traits of pressure, opportunity, 
and rationalisation formed a fraud triangle critical in 
identifying factors constantly present in fraud. 
The fraud triangle theory as developed by Cressey 
(1953) was widely supported and used by audit 
professionals and standards’ setters as a tool for detecting 
fraud (Kassem & Higson 2012). This is evidenced 
in the revised standards issued by the International 
Auditing Standards Board in 2009 specifically known as 
International Standard on Auditing 240 (ISA 240): The 
Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit 
of Financial Statements which stated that “Fraud, whether 
fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of 
FIGURE 1. Fraud Triangle Theory
Source: Wells (2005)
Pressure
Opportunity Rationalization
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list and administrative list; (2) Enforcement related press 
release and; (3) Press release by media. These sources were 
accessible from the Malaysian Securities Commission’s 
website. Details of those companies were further reviewed 
and screened to select only those relevant public listed 
companies that have violated Section 122A, Section 122B, 
Section 122C, Section 122D of the Securities Industry 
Act 1983 and Regulation 4 of the Securities Industry 
(Compliance with Approved Accounting Standards) 
Regulation 1999 relevant to the fraudulent and misstated 
financial reporting offence. Based on the review, 19 public 
listed companies have been found to have committed 
fraudulent financial reporting in violation of the Securities 
Commission Act and Regulations between 1993 and 2014. 
Relevant quarterly and final year’s financial statements for 
two consecutive periods (fraud period and period prior to 
fraud) related to those 19 fraudulent reporting companies 
were obtained from the Bursa Malaysia’s website. Two out 
of 19 fraudulent reporting companies were excluded from 
the sample as one was committed fraudulent reporting 
within the same year after being listed on Bursa Malaysia 
and the other was due to inadequate financial statement 
data for the application of the Beneish M-Score model. 
To detect earnings manipulation, the model requires two 
consecutive periods of the company’s financial statements 
data, namely the period when the fraud is committed 
and the prior period. This leaves a final sample of 17 
public listed companies related to fraudulent reporting 
to be examined for earnings manipulation using the 
Beneish M-Score model. Data extracted from the relevant 
fraudulent and misstated financial statements for two 
consecutive periods were used to calculate the Beneish 
M-Score total.
The results of the Beneish M-score’s total calculation 
for the fraudulent reporting companies were observed and 
documented. The results were then analysed to determine 
the number and percentage of fraudulent reporting 
companies scoring greater than -2.22, -1.89, and -1.78 
to prove the reliability of the Beneish M-Score model in 
detecting potential earnings manipulation and fraud in 
financial statements of fraudulent reporting companies 
as identified by SC Malaysia before public announcement 
was made in press. Furthermore, 8 variables indexes that 
form the Beneish M-Score model were analysed for every 
fraudulent reporting company and compared against a 
defined index threshold provided by Beneish (1999).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 provides the results of the calculation of Beneish 
M-score total and its 8 variable indexes for the 17 sampled 
companies. 
Three of the fraudulent reporting companies scoring 
the highest M-score totals in ranking order are Aktif 
Lifestyle Berhad (73.92), Inix Technologies Berhad 
(2.82) and Oilcorp Berhad (-0.02). The company with the 
highest M-score total also has the highest variables index 
exceeding defined threshold suggested by Beneish (1999) 
for Asset Quality Index (AQI = 26.61), Depreciation 
Index (DEPI = 4.95), and Accruals (Accruals = 14.28), 
indicating potential severe earnings manipulation. 
Further investigation also revealed that Aktif Lifestyle 
Berhad had earlier been charged in 2004 for failure to 
comply with approved accounting standards, specifically 
FRS 122 on business combination which resulted in 
material misstatements in the financial statements to 
the extent of being issued with adverse audit report. 
Inix Technologies Berhad, the company with the second 
highest total M-score, also scored the highest for Sales 
Growth Index (SGI = 6.95), above median score for its 
Sales, General, Administrative Expenses Index (SGAI 
= 1.14) and Accruals (Accruals = 0.16). Furthermore, 
when investigated, Inix Technologies Berhad had been 
TABLE 1. Total M-Score for the companies with fraudulent and misstated financial statements
Misstatement yr Company DSRI GMI AQI SGI DEPI SGAI LVGI Accruals MSCORE
2011 Silver Bird Bhd 1.40 1.23 0.93 1.22 0.99 0.80 1.00 0.05 -1.56 
2007 Mems Tech Bhd 0.70 1.13 1.36 1.07 1.44 0.77 3.24 -0.13 -3.76 
2007 LFE Corp Bhd 1.03 0.40 0.79 1.19 0.54 0.68 0.91 0.03 -2.53 
2007 Axis Incorp Bhd 1.02 1.03 0.83 1.26 0.83 0.50 1.04 0.12 -1.65 
2007-2006 Oilcorp Berhad 1.50 1.53 0.88 2.90 0.86 0.62 1.16 0.02 -0.02 
2007 Talam Corp Bhd 2.60 -0.49 1.02 0.36 0.96 0.75 1.00 -0.03 -2.48 
4th quarter 2006 Inix Technologies 0.23 1.19 0.48 6.95 0.42 1.14 0.57 0.16 2.82 
dec06/qtrs07 Satang Hold Bhd 1.17 0.91 0.48 1.26 0.52 1.02 1.41 0.33 -1.02 
2006 Kosmo Tech Ind Bhd 1.87 1.06 2.27 1.13 0.45 1.78 1.04 0.10 -0.78 
2006 Megan Media Hold Bhd 1.65 0.95 0.86 1.14 0.91 0.92 1.04 -0.02 -1.93 
4th quarter 2006 Transmile Group Bhd 1.91 0.88 0.89 1.80 1.00 1.43 0.81 0.08 -0.70 
2005 Nasioncom Hold Bhd 2.18 1.05 0.78 1.21 0.77 0.98 1.21 0.17 -0.56 
2005 Welli Multi Corp Bhd 0.99 1.38 0.92 1.30 0.72 0.70 1.02 0.06 -1.76 
2004 United U-Li Corp Bhd 1.09 1.00 1.00 1.23 0.95 0.91 1.13 0.15 -1.53 
4th quarter 2004 Goh ban Huat Berhad 0.93 1.60 0.64 0.91 1.13 2.41 0.65 0.33 -1.01 
2004 Aktif Lifestyle Berhad 0.84 0.33 26.61 1.01 4.95 1.80 0.10 14.28 73.92 
2003 Plymate Hold Bhd 1.33 0.87 0.45 1.21 0.66 0.95 1.05 0.11 -1.81
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found of submitting false statement to Bursa Malaysia 
for the year ended December 2006, with its revenue being 
overstated. 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics results for the 
Beneish M-Score, including its 8 variables indexes.
With reference to Table 2, 12 companies (71%) were 
found to have variable Accruals (Accruals) score higher 
than the threshold limit of 0.03. The result shows that the 
majority of examined companies breached the Accruals 
threshold limit more than other variables’ indexes, which 
may be the contributing factor that triggers accounting 
enforcement action by SC Malaysia. The second highest 
variable index to have breached the suggested threshold 
limit is Days Sales Receivables Index (DSRI) with 6 
(35%) of the fraudulent reporting companies detected of 
exceeding. This may suggest that 6 of these companies 
overstated their revenue abnormally, which in return 
prompts an investigation by the authority. The third 
highest variable index is shared by the Leverage Index 
(LVGI) and Sales, General, Administrative Index, having 
5 (29%) fraudulent companies respectively exceeding 
their suggested threshold limit. Gross Margin Index (GMI) 
falls in the fourth place with 4 (24%) of the fraudulent 
companies exceeding the threshold limit, followed by 3 
indexes of AQI, SGI, and DEPI with 3 (18%) fraudulent 
reporting companies respectively exceeding their 
recommended threshold limit. 
Table 3 shows the percentage of fraudulent reporting 
companies having the total Beneish M-Score greater than 
-2.22, -1.89 and -1.78.
Based on Table 3, fourteen (82%) out of seventeen 
fraudulent reporting companies were found to have total 
M-score higher than -2.22. Furthermore, when a score 
greater than -1.89 and greater than -1.78 were applied, 
the former identified thirteen (76%) out of 17 companies 
as earnings manipulator and fraudster while the latter 
detected twelve (71%) out of 17 companies. The findings 
suggest that Beneish M-score model is more than capable 
of detecting the majority of companies committing 
earnings manipulation and financial statement fraud even 
when different total recommended score of greater than 
-2.22, -1.89, and -1.78 be considered. Furthermore, by 
choosing the total score greater than -2.22 will ensure 
fraudulent financial reporting companies to be detected 
at 82% accuracy rate which is higher than 76% accuracy 
rate as in Beneish (1999) and exceeding 71% accuracy 
rate as in Beneish, Lee and Nichols (2013). This finding 
supports hypotheses 1 that the Beneish M-score model 
is reliable in detecting the majority of companies 
committing financial statement fraud as disclosed by 
the Malaysian Securities Commission. Nevertheless, a 
score greater than -2.22 would expose higher percentage 
of misclassification of potential manipulators and non-
manipulators by the model if used on hold out samples. 
Total score of greater than -1.89 for the Beneish M-score 
model also shows a promising result with detection rate of 
76% of fraudulent reporting companies, which is similar 
to the detection accuracy rate of earnings manipulation in 
Beneish (1999) but exceeding the detection rate of 71% 
in Beneish, Lee, and Nichols (2013). However, when a 
total score of -1.78 is selected for the model, the detection 
accuracy rate of fraudulent reporting companies stays 
at 71% which is lower than Beneish (1999) at 76% but 
similar to Beneish, Lee and Nichols (2013) at 71%. 
CONCLUSION
Earnings manipulation involves deliberate misstatements 
of financial statements in violation of the accounting 
rules to deceive users into believing bogus positive 
performance. The impact will be detrimental towards 
stakeholders who can be misled into making erroneous 
decisions and business strategies while relying on the 
materially misstated financial statements, resulting 
in huge monetary losses on their side. Nevertheless, 
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics for the Beneish M-Score total and indexes
 DSRI GMI AQI SGI DEPI SGAI LVGI Accruals MSCORE
Mean 1.32 0.94 2.42 1.54 1.06 1.07 1.08 0.93 3.16 
Median 1.17 1.03 0.88 1.21 0.86 0.92 1.04 0.10 -1.53 
Max 2.60 1.60 26.61 6.95 4.95 2.41 3.24 14.28 73.92 
Min  0.23 -0.49 0.45 0.01 0.42 0.50 0.10 -0.13 -3.76 
Index threshold limit 1.47 1.19 1.25 1.61 1.08 1.04 1.11 0.03  
No o companies above threshold limit 6 4 3 3 3 5 5 12
% of companies above threshold limit 35% 24% 18% 18% 18% 29% 29% 71%
TABLE 3. % of M-score > -2.22; -1.89; -1.78
  Total M-score > -2.22 Total M-score > -1.89 Total M-score > -1.78
Number of Fraudulent reporting companies 
 exceeding out of 17 14 13 12
Detection accuracy rate % 82% 76% 71%
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earnings manipulation scheme and financial statement 
fraud are difficult to establish as they are well-concealed 
by the perpetrator. Thus, various tools to assist detection 
of earnings manipulation and fraud are available with the 
Beneish M-score model garnering some fame for being 
used as a financial forensic tool by fraud examiners, 
and being referred to in professional articles, academic 
textbooks, and reference materials in the United States. 
Although the model is quite popular in the US, its 
reliability in assisting stakeholders to detect earnings 
manipulation and financial statement fraud in Malaysian 
listed companies is still not well documented. Thus, this 
study aimed at proving the reliability of the Beneish 
M-score model in detecting earnings manipulation and 
fraudulent financial reporting of Malaysian public listed 
companies that have been investigated and charged by SC 
Malaysia before a public announcement was made.
The study reveals that 82% of the public listed 
companies prosecuted for fraudulent financial reporting 
by SC Malaysia have been detected by the Beneish 
M-score model for committing earnings manipulation 
and financial statement fraud during the fraud year before 
a public announcement was made. The model remains 
reliable even when a more conservative total score id 
used as cut-off point as in Beneish (1999) to distinguish 
between potential manipulators and non-manipulators 
with detection accuracy rate of 76% and 71% respectively 
and with a lower misclassification rate. Thus, the model is 
well supported by the findings to be reliable and capable 
of identifying potential listed companies in Malaysia that 
practice earnings manipulation and having the potential 
of being investigated and charged for fraudulent financial 
reporting in violation of the Malaysian Securities 
Commission Act and Regulations. 
This study contributes by enhancing knowledge on 
financial statement fraud and investigation domain as it 
extends support on the reliability of the Beneish M-score 
model for detecting fraudulent financial reporting not 
just in the United States’ public listed companies but also 
effective for public listed corporations in Malaysia. The 
results will be important to stakeholders especially the 
management of the company who can rely on the M-score 
model to check for irregularities in its financial report 
before submission to Bursa Malaysia to prevent from 
any potential backlash that could damage its reputation. 
Should the model detect any potential fraud, this will 
allow the management to trigger immediate investigation 
and corrections to ensure the company’s financial 
statements show a true and fair financial position. Other 
than prospective and existing shareholders, auditors, and 
forensic investigators can also benefit from this model 
to assist them in verifying the integrity of the company’s 
financial statements for further decision making on 
matters related to shareholding and investigation. In 
addition, academic researchers can apply the M-score 
model to identify potential fraudulent financial reporting 
companies in the present setting as a proxy to represent 
actual financial statement fraud corporations for further 
analysis. This may overcome the problem where only a 
small number of companies prosecuted for accounting 
fraud were made known to the public with the rest 
remaining undetected. 
Some limitations of this study are as follows. Firstly, 
the Beneish M-Score model according to Beneish’s 
(1999) can incorrectly classify 24% of manipulators 
as non-manipulators while having the tendency to 
misclassify 17.5% of the non-manipulators as earnings 
manipulators, when the total score cut-off point is greater 
than -1.89. The percentage of misclassification reduces 
further when a total M score of greater than -1.78 is used 
with manipulator misclassification stands at 26% and 
non-manipulator misclassification at 13.8% Secondly, 
the model can be only used to analyse financial statement 
data of the public listed companies and cannot be reliably 
applied in the private limited companies’ environment. 
Future research should attempt to apply the Beneish 
M-score model on all financial statements of public 
companies listed on the main board to detect and 
classify them into potential financial statement fraud 
companies and non-potential financial statement fraud 
companies in the latest year setting. This can be extended 
to another related future research where analysis can be 
made on corporate governance characteristics between 
potential financial statement fraud companies and non-
potential fraud companies and to confirm whether any 
differences exist. Other future research can also focus 
on studying share price performance and shareholders’ 
return between both potential financial statement fraud 
companies and non-potential fraud companies for the 
benefit of stakeholders.
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